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SELF-INCRIMINATION AND JURY TRIAL
The result of Gault and Winship is that juvenile court proceed-
ings where criminal acts are alleged must be considered criminal in
nature, and those procedural safeguards necessary for "fair treat-
ment" must be applied as in adult criminal courts. These decisions
infer that the juvenile courts, because of their lack of sufficient safe-
guards, have failed to fully provide the benevolent custodial care
and treatment that the reformers envisioned. The states, however,
are left with the problem of determining what safeguards, besides
those set out in Gault"9 and Winship, are necessary to insure fair
treatment.
CRIMINAL LAW - SELF-INCRIMINATION AND RIGHT TO
JURY TRIAL - PRETRIAL NOTICE OF ALIBI AND
SIX-MAN JURY
Williams v. Florida,
399 u.s. 78 (1970)
Accused of robbery by the State of Florida, petitioner filed two
pretrial motions. The first was for a protective order to free himself
from the requirements of the Florida notice-of-alibi rule. This rule
requires a defendant, on written demand by the prosecutor, to give
pretrial notice if he contemplates claiming an alibi, and to supply
the State with information about the place he will claim to have
been and the names and addresses of the witnesses he intends to
use. The second motion was to impanel a 12-man jury rather than
the six-man jury provided by Florida law in all but capital cases.2
The trial court denied both motions, and the defendant was con-
victed and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Florida District
Court of Appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The Court affirmed the conviction,4 holding that
the Florida notice-of-alibi rule did not deprive the petitioner of due
process, a fair trial, or his privilege against self-incrimination,5 and
that the use of a six-man jury did not violate his right to trial by
jury.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court, quickly disposed of
petitioner's argument that the alibi discovery deprived him of due
the statutory standard concerning the sufficiency of proof, most juvenile judges have
tacitly applied the highest standard of proof in delinquency proceedings. Id. at 55i.
19 See note 8 supra.
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process or a fair trial. He observed that the rule provides for re-
ciprocity by requiring the State to disclose the names and addresses
of the witnesses it plans to use in rebuttal to the alibi. Furthermore,
Florida permits additional discovery of the State's case by permitting
a defendant access to such information as his own written state-
ments, physical examination, and grand jury testimony.7  This ex-
change of information in advance of trial is intended to facilitate
an accurate determination of guilt or innocence and is consistent
with the purposes and rationale of the due process model which the
Court has developed.
Petitioner's second argument was that the requirement that he
disclose the name and address of his alibi witness violated his rights
against self-incrimination by forcing him to be a witness against
himself. Mr. Justice White pointed out, however, that petitioner had
the right to either present an alibi or remain silent. In spite of the
practical pressures which may have induced petitioner to present an
alibi, the decision was his own and thus the alibi disclosure was not
"compelled" testimony within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
The notice-of-alibi rule merely requires pretrial disclosure of what
the defendant intends to reveal during trial. The Court found noth-
ing in the Constitution which gives a defendant the right to conceal
his defense until the conclusion of the State's case. Moreover, a
continuance would be available to the State if it could show sur-
prise because of the introduction of an alibi during the trial. Flor-
ida's notice-of-alibi rule only permits the State to achieve before trial
what it could accomplish by a continuance during trial, thus avoid-
ing the delay and inconvenience that accompany the latter."
At least 15 states besides Florida have alibi-notice requirements.
1 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.200.
2 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10(1) (1967).
3 Williams v. Florida, 224 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1969).
4 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
5 The fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination was made applicable
to the states through the 14th amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
6 In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court held that the 14th amend-
ment guarantees a right to trial by jury in all criminal cases which would come within
the sixth amendment's guarantee if they were tried in a federal court.
7 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220. See also FED. R_ CRim. P. 16.
8 Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the notice-of-alibi question.
They argued that the majority's approval of the notice-of-alibi rule was a dangerous
departure from both history and the fifth amendment right of a defendant in a criminal
case to remain silent while the state attempts to prove its case without his assistance.
399 U.S. at 108.
9 ARuZ. R. ClM. P. 192(B); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1631 to -33 (1956)
IOWA CODE § 777.18 (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1964); Mscm.
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The Court made it dear, however, that its decision in Williams
should not be construed as approval of the other states' statutes.
It stated that each such statute would have to be examined in its
own context with emphasis on whether the defendant is granted re-
ciprocal discovery against the state.10 Provisions such as Iowa's re-
quirement that the defense indicate what it expects to prove by the
testimony of each alibi witness," and Kansas' mandatory exclusion
of alibi evidence when the defendant fails to comply with the statu-
tory provisions,' 2 raise significant problems concerning who bears the
burden of proof in a criminal case and whether a defendant can re-
ceive a fair trial when part of his defense is inadmissible.' s Some
states with questionable provisions may conform their statutes to the
Florida model, but others will await specific challenges to the validity
of particular requirements.
The broad, reciprocal pretrial discovery which Williams portends
will aid in the removal of the elements of surprise and error from
the quest for criminal justice. Full disclosure of witnesses by each
side,14 along with discovery of grand jury testimony,'5 medical rec-
ords,' 6 and other information in advance of trial, should result in
earlier, more valid pleadings to more equitable charges in cases which
presently clog court dockets. Neither the prosecutor nor the ac-
cused, knowing the information he will have to disclose during pre-
trial discovery, will be likely to overcharge or underplea his case if
CoMP. LAws §§ 768.20-.21 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 630.14 (1961); N.J. CT. R. 3:5-9;
N.Y. CODE CRIM. P. § 295-1 (1958); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.58 (Page 1953);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585 (1961); PA. R. CRLM. P. 312; S.D. CODE § 34.2801 (Supp.
1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-22-17 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6561-62
(1959); Wis. STAT. § 955.07 (1961). See generally Epstein, Advance Notice of
Alibi, 55 J. CRIM. LC. & P.S. 29 (1964).
30 399 U.S. at 82 n.1.
11 IOWA CODE § 777.18 (1962).
22 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1341 (1964).
18 See Rider v. Crouse, 357 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1966). In Rider, a habeas corpus
action by a state prisoner, the court held that refusal to permit the accused to present
evidence of an alibi because he failed to give the State proper notice in accordance with
Kansas' statute did not deprive him of due process of law. Most states, however, includ-
ing Florida, give the trial judge discretion to admit the evidence even though statutory
provisions have not been complied with. The Williams Court emphasized that the
question of the validity of the threatened sanction of exclusion of alibi evidence for
failure to give notice was not in issue, and that such a practice would raise sixth amend-
ment problems. 399 U.S. at 83 n.14.
14See N.J. CT. R. 3:5-11; FI.A. R. CRIM. P. 1.220. Both rules provide for an ex-
change of witness lists with sanctions for nondisclosure which include the exclusion of
undisclosed evidence.
15 See CAL. PEg. CODE § 938.1 (West 1969).
16See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 CaL Rptr. 879
(1962); 76 HARv. L REV. 838 (1963).
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it is unsubstantiated by discoverable evidence. Furthermore, each
side, as it discovers the strengths and weaknesses of the other's case,
will be inclined to engage in plea bargaining to avoid trial.'7  The
defendant who would normally languish in jail unable to meet
bail,18 only to plead guilty eventually to a lesser offense, should
welcome the chance to have his case resolved early in the process,
thus avoiding "deadtime."' 19
The second issue in Williams involved the constitutionality of
Florida's six-man jury statute.20 The Court began its discussion with
the basic premise that the 14th amendment carries over to the states
the sixth amendment right to trial by jury in all criminal cases.2 '
Since the sixth amendment makes no reference to jury size, the Court
looked at the common law and found that the requirement of 12
jurors was "a historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes
which gave rise to the jury in the first place.' 22 The Court pointed
out that not every common law jury feature was carried over into
the Constitution. In fact, an earlier version of the sixth amend-
ment had gone to a conference committee with several common law
provisions,23 and was returned without them. Subsequently, when-
ever the First Congress desired to incorporate characteristics of the
common law jury system into any legislation, its language precisely
indicated the features to be included - for example, the insertion of
the vicinage requirements in the Judiciary Bill which was signed by
the President the same day Congress agreed to the final form of the
Bill of Rights. 24  Thus, the Court concluded that a jury "should
probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from
outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for
obtaining a representative cross section of the community."25  It
17 See, e.g., Siler, Guilty Plea Negotiations, in CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
ch. 13 (R. Cipes ed. 1969).
18 See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 37-38 (1967).
19 See, e.g., Katz, Gideon's Trumpet: Mournful and Muffled, 55 IOwA L. REV. 523
(1970).
20 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.10(1) (1967).
21 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
22 399 U.S. at 89-90.
23 The original House version of the amendment provided, in part: "The trial of all
crimes . . . shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the req-
uisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed req-
uisites." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789). For further discussion of the common
law provisions, see 399 U.S. at 94-98.
24 399 U.S. at 97.
25Id. at 100.
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found a six-man jury capable of performing these functions. The
Court did not, however, hold that six was the minimum number
necessary for a jury to reach a just verdict. It left Congress and the
states free to experiment in this area.
Since the Court refused to incorporate into the Constitution the
federal standard of a 12-man jury in all criminal cases,20 both that
federal standard and the state practice of providing 12-man juries
for all capital cases will endure only as long as the respective legis-
latures so choose. The Court, however, has indicated that particular
components do remain essential elements of the jury trial, such as
the requirement that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt.27 But whether the traditional right to a unanimous verdict
remains an essential part of due process is now questionable. The
Court discussed the unanimous verdict's possible value in insuring
that the prosecutor bear the greater burden of proof, but several
states presently use nonunanimous verdicts in specific kinds of fel-
ony cases, 28 and Williams could encourage further inroads into this
area.
In addition to the Williams decision's precedential effect on the
constitutional stature of other components of the jury trial, the
Court's holding will indirectly affect the continued significance of
those components, particularly jury unanimity. Sociological and
psychological studies have indicated that there are a variety of re-
straints on individual participation, depending upon group size, and
that an individual is more likely to reexamine his position when ex-
posed to a variety of opinions and solutions.29 It might be argued
that smaller juries are therefore more prone to render unanimous
verdicts. Eventually, the Court will have to decide at what mini-
mum point the number of jurors begins to diminish the intended
function of the jury in the judicial process.
2 RFED. -Cm  P. 23(b). Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in part, argued that the
defendant had a right to a 12-man jury because, under Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), "the same 'trial by jury' is guaranteed to state defendants by the Fourteenth
Amendment as to federal defendants by the Sixth." 399 U.S. at 116.
27 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
2 8 See LA. CODE CrM. P. ANN. art 782 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 17.355,
136.330, 136.610 (1953). But cf. Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir.
1953). In Hibdon it was held that the right to a unanimous verdict could not be
waived. The Supreme Court has recently decided to review whether the sixth amend-
ment requires unanimity for conviction. See State v. Johnson, 230 So.2d 825 (La. 1970),
prob. juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1970) (No. 5161); State v. Apodaca,
462 P.2d 691 (Ore. Cr. App. 1969), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 9,
1970) (No. 5338).
2 9 Kelley & Thibaur, Experimental Studies of Group Problem Solving and Process,
in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 735, 762, 771 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954).
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